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Abstract 
 
From 1988 to 2001, the supply of transplantable organs grew by 140%, an accomplishment 
dwarfed by the simultaneous rise in the number of individuals awaiting a transplant, which 
increased by 650%. In response to the immense shortage and historically high family refusal 
rates, nearly all states have adopted first-person consent legislation, which allows for a donor 
card or one’s name on a state donor registry to stand as sufficient consent to donate, and further 
prevents the family from overriding the decision of the donor. To date, no study has examined 
the efficacy of the policy across adopting states. I exploit the varied timing in the adoption of 
first-person consent legislation to examine the change in the supply of donors among states that 
adopted first-person consent in the late ‘90’s and early 2000’s using states with no such laws as 
controls. I demonstrate that states that passed first-person consent legislation before 2003 saw 
donation rates increase 10-15% beyond donation rates in non-adopting states. Taken together 
with typically low family consent rates when the wishes of the donor are unknown, my results 
strongly reinforce the need for actions that encourage more individuals to communicate their 
donation preferences, either explicitly via a registry or by discussing them with family. 
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I. Introduction  
Between 1988 and 2011, the number of individuals awaiting transplant of a vital organ 
grew by 650% while the annual number of donors increased by only 140% (Figure 1). In the 
same time span, the ratio of transplants preformed to the size of the waiting list fell from 84% to 
25% (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network [OPTN], 2014; Scientific Registry of 
Transplant Recipients [SRTR], 2012. Today’s average transplant candidate has been waiting for 
an organ for more than two years and the median wait time for kidney transplants is nearly four 
years1 (SRTR, 2012). Approximately 80% of all available organs come from deceased donors 
(after brain death or circulatory death) (OPTN, 2014). The growth of the transplant waiting list 
continues to outpace the marginal increase in organ donations year after year, while Organ 
Procurement Organization (OPO) estimates show recent declines in the number of identified 
potential deceased organ donors (SRTR, 2012, Table 4.2). On average, 18 individuals die each 
day while waiting for organ transplants (Health Resources and Services Administration [HRSA], 
2013).  
The shortage is not a new problem; since its inception in 1984, the Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network (OPTN) has been unable to secure enough organs to meet demand, 
and due to medical advances in recent years, mean survival times for those on the waiting list 
continue to increase, particularly for those awaiting kidney transplants (Siminoff, Arnold, 
Caplan, Virnig, & Seltzer, 1995; Klein et al., 2010; Traino & Siminoff, 2013). The U.S. has 
historically relied on altruistic donations, operating under what is known as informed consent 
whereby an individual must opt in and indicate their wish to donate before death. In the event 
that a potential donor’s wishes are unknown, the next of kin is asked for consent. Contrary to the 
spirit of informed consent legislation, even when it can be verified that a potential donor has 
explicitly documented their desire to be an organ donor, it has long been the case that 
procurement professionals still request consent from the family even though it is not legally 
required (Siminoff & Lawrence, 2002; Edinger, 1990). Several studies reveal that the overall 
family refusal rate has hovered near 50% for decades. Family members cite confusion or 
disbelief about brain death2, concerns about burial and disfigurement, and a lack of knowledge of 
the decedent’s donation preferences as the largest factors for refusing donation (Gortmaker et al., 
1998; Siminoff et al., 1995; Siminoff & Lawrence, 2002).  
                                                
1 For those on the waiting list as of 2007, the most recent year data was available 
2 Specifically, the belief that one can recover from brain death 
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In response to the continual shortage and persistently high family refusal rates, all states 
have passed legislation authorizing what is known as first-person consent for organ donation 
(Chon, et al., 2013). First-person consent laws explicitly allow for donations from deceased 
donors to proceed when intent to donate can be confirmed (via donor card, driver’s license 
designation, or state donor registry) without requiring transplant professionals to obtain 
permission from the next of kin. Moreover, they expressly forbid a third party from overriding 
the donor’s wishes unless they can produce confirmation of abrogation3 (Mesich-Brant & 
Grossback, 2005; Traino & Siminoff, 2013). Despite the fact that the legislation ensures consent 
to donate is irrevocable by a third party, it is unclear whether the legislation has had an effect on 
the supply of organ donors among all states. The general public has consistently expressed a high 
level of approval for donation with over 90% of adults reporting they support or strongly support 
donation and transplantation efforts (Health Resources and Services Administration [HRSA], 
2012). This statistic is frequently (and misleadingly) cited to equate superficial general favor for 
the idea of donation with a personal intent to donate or willingness to consent on behalf of a 
family member (Siminoff et al., 1995; Tabarrok, 2004). Historically, consent rates have been 
substantially lower than the aforementioned statistic would indicate, drawing increased attention 
to respecting the wishes of those potential donors who have expressed intent to donate. First-
person consent is intended to help narrow the gap between high levels of expressed general 
support for donation and low consent rates by ensuring that the decedent’s wishes are carried out 
whenever they are documented. In nearly all cases, the legislation is enacted concomitantly with 
a compliant registry that provides a means to record and execute intent. 
Using data containing the number of deceased organ donors by state from 1991-2006, I 
examine changes in the supply of deceased and brain-dead organ donors in response to first-
person consent laws, the efficacy of which have yet to be studied across all states. Exploiting 
variation in the enactment of such legislation across states, I use a difference-in-differences 
approach to examine changes in the supply of donors in states that passed first-person consent 
laws in the late 90’s and early 2000’s using states without such legislative changes as controls. 
The results of my analysis show that, compared to non-adopting states, states that passed first-
person consent legislation before 2003 saw an increase in donation rates of 10-15%. These 
                                                
3 Although, some states require only a verbal expression of revocation in the presence of two individuals (one of 
whom is disinterested); written documentation is not always necessary (Uniform Law Commission [ULC], n.d.c). 
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findings are robust to various model specifications and definitions of the donor rate and suggest 
that first-person consent legislation leads to sizeable increases in the supply of organ donors. 
 
II. Background 
As of this writing, a total of 47 states have enacted some form of the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act (UAGA) of 2006 which specifically prevents any family member or otherwise 
responsible party from revoking an anatomical gift made by a potential donor prior to death, 
which is known as first-person consent4 (ULC, n.d.b). The Act allows for consent to be 
expressed in several forms including donor status designation on a driver’s license or ID card, a 
donor card, or via compliant donor registries5. Nearly all states have coupled their adoption of 
this law with the establishment of, or update to, an existing donor registry to bring it into 
compliance with first-person consent. Uniform acts are drafted to address problems that extend 
across state lines and serve as proposed laws for adoption in full or in part at the state level 
(ULC, 2014). Transplantation is necessarily time sensitive for vital organs and it requires great 
cooperation among states. Thus it is desirable that legislation be as consistent between states as 
possible, particularly in cases where potential donors are from another state. It is important to 
note that states pass the uniform laws individually and sometimes with modifications. I refer to 
the 2006 UAGA singularly since the portion of the law as it pertains to first-person consent is 
present and consistent across states that have adopted it.  
The 2006 UAGA is an update to two prior versions of the Act. The first UAGA was 
promulgated in 1968 and quickly adopted by all states. It established that a donor card was 
sufficient consent for donation provided two witnesses had signed it (National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [NCCUSL], 1968)). The 1987 UAGA removed the 
witness requirement and affirmed that consent from the next of kin was not required if the 
decedent had already consented to donate, though it did not forbid OPOs from requesting it, as 
was the general practice. The 1987 UAGA was adopted in 26 states and is occasionally likened 
to first-person consent since it clarifies the adequacy of documented intent. For the purposes of 
this analysis, I make the essential distinction that, by the current and generally accepted 
definition, first-person consent legislation expressly forbids any third party from overriding a 
documented donation decision.  
                                                
4 Also known as donor designation or first-person authorization 
5 Non-first-person consent registries are known as intent-only registries 
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There are two main pathways by which any legislation could impact donation rates under 
the policy of informed consent: by increasing the pool of potential donors or by increasing 
consent rates for donation. Only a very small proportion of the population is ever in a position to 
donate; primary circumstances of death among adult organ donors include motor vehicle 
accidents (MVAs), head trauma, suicide, and homicide (OPTN, 2013). Past studies have 
estimated the size of the potential donor pool to be somewhere between 10,500 and 17,000 
individuals annually, roughly 1% of the 1.8 million annual fatalities that occurred in the same 
time period (Sheehy et al., 2003; Guadagnoli, Christiansen, & Beasley, 2003). OPOs have 
continually attempted to widen the potential donor pool by redefining and expanding donation 
criteria. Throughout recent years, OPOs have relied increasingly on marginal donors6 over the 
age of 60 who would not have met previous criteria (Punch, Hayes, LaPorte, McBride, & Seely, 
2007). As a result, the age distribution of deceased donors has been shifting with declining 
proportions of younger donors while proportions of older donors have been on the rise (Sung et 
al., 2008). Concurrently, as an increasing number of states have implemented donor registries it 
has become apparent that older adults register as donors in lower proportions than relatively 
younger adults with 66% of those age 18-34 reporting they had registered as of 2012 compared 
to 52% for those over age 66. This is a significant improvement in less than a decade, however, 
and is nearly double the 26% of those over 66 who reported they had signed up when surveyed in 
2005 (HRSA, 2012).  
Demographic differences between the pool of potential donors and the population of 
registered organ donors are important since first-person consent legislation acts primarily 
through state organ donor registries, which historically have been the primary method of 
documenting consent and the most timely and straightforward way for procurement personnel to 
ascertain donor status. One of the main arguments for adoption of first-person consent is that it 
has the potential to increase donations by reducing dependence on families for consent, thereby 
increasing conversion rates if states work to increase the number of registered donors. OPOs and 
nonprofit organizations such as Donate Life America have placed substantial emphasis on 
registering as many donors as possible, particularly among racial and ethnic minority groups for 
whom consent rates have historically been low, but together who comprise over half the number 
                                                
6Known as expanded criteria donors (ECD) 
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of individuals on transplant waiting lists (Donate Life America (DLA), n.d.). States have also 
worked hard to target segments of the population most likely to become potential donors.  
Prior to the widespread adoption of the 2006 UAGA, nearly twenty states had enacted 
first-person consent of their own accord, including Pennsylvania as early as 1994, followed by 
New Jersey, Iowa, Ohio, and others. Nearly all of these states passed first-person consent 
legislation at the same time as they implemented a legally binding donor registry. New Mexico, 
West Virginia, and Florida had existing donor registries that were updated for compliance when 
they passed first-person consent, while Virginia did not implement a registry until several years 
after first-person consent was enacted (UNOS, 2010). Among states without first-person consent 
legislation, roughly one third enacted intent-only donor registries within the same time period. I 
make use of the variation in early adoption of first-person consent to investigate its impact on 
donation rates in comparison to states with no such legislation. I then narrow my focus to the 
states that passed first-person consent and compliant registries simultaneously to estimate the 
extent to which such registries have influenced donation rates. 
 
III. Data 
I obtained data on the number of deceased adult donors by state and the circumstance of 
their death from 1991 to 2006 from The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. The 
years of adoption of state-level first-person consent legislation were available from UNOS via 
the Internet Archives and were confirmed where possible using Westlaw Campus Research and 
individual state legislative websites. I compiled the years of enactment for state organ donor 
registries from Donate Life America’s annual donor designation report cards. State-level health 
expenditure data was retrieved from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services. 
Demographic data such as state levels of age, race, and educational achievement was compiled 
using the Current Population Survey’s outgoing rotation group files (retrieved from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research [NBER]). I control for population density and adult population 
within each state, as well as median income, all of which were retrieved from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and the U.S. Statistical Abstract7. Income and healthcare expenditures were adjusted for 
inflation and are reported in 2012 dollars. 
                                                
7 Intercensal population density calculated via linear interpolation 
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I control for whether a state has primary enforcement motorcycle helmet and seatbelt 
laws in any given year as they influence the number of motor vehicle fatalities and have been 
shown to affect donation rates (Dickert-Conlin, Elder, & Moore, 2011). Motorcycle helmet law 
data were retrieved from the Governors Highway Safety Association and seat belt laws and 
driver’s license renewal lengths came from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. I also 
explore several different measures of the donation rate in my analysis, including donors per 
million population, donors per mortality, and donors per motor vehicle accident. Motor vehicle 
accident fatality data is from the Department of Transportation’s Fatality Analysis and Reporting 
system (files via NBER) and includes all adult motor vehicle, motorcycle, and pedestrian 
fatalities. Mortality data was retrieved from the Center for Disease Control’s compressed 
mortality files. 
 
IV. Identification Strategy 
 Nearly all states have enacted first-person consent and a compliant organ donor registry 
as of the time of this study. I focus on outcomes among states that adopted first-person consent 
on their own prior to the 2006 UAGA using states without such laws in the same time period as 
controls. A total of 19 states adopted first-person consent between 1994 and 2006, but to prevent 
any confounding effects that may result from the widespread adoption of the 2006 UAGA, I 
restrict the time period under consideration to years prior to and including 20068. I investigate 
the sensitivity of my analysis to the inclusion of 2006 by running a separate analysis for the years 
1991-2005. One of the primary mechanisms of action for first-person consent legislation is 
through the legally binding donor registries that are often simultaneously established. Many state 
donor registries rely heavily on their Departments of Motor Vehicles for new donor registrations 
(in addition to online signups), which indicates that it may take at least one complete driver’s 
license renewal period for the majority of state residents to be presented with an opportunity to 
register if they do not seek it out themselves. If donor registration rates are truly a driving force 
behind donation rates, by restricting my analysis to years just prior to the first passage of the 
UAGA while including states that independently passed first-person consent as late as 2006, I 
may be unable to accurately capture the true impact of the legislative changes for other treatment 
states. Thus I exclude from consideration the eight states that passed first-person consent laws 
                                                
8 The first states to pass the 2006 UAGA did so in 2007; it was approved by the NCCUSL for promulgation in July 
2006. 
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between 2003 and 2006, which ensures each included state has at least four years past the 
enactment of the law in all specifications.  
 Treatment states are defined as the 13 states where first-person consent legislation was 
passed between 1994 and 2002. I designate the year after the legislation was passed as the first 
year of intervention. Before estimating the impact of first-person consent legislation, I first 
examine pre-existing trends in donation rates between treatment and control states. Figure 2 
illustrates average donation trends for the 13 states that adopted first-person consent from 1994-
2002 compared to the 30 states that passed no such law.  The horizontal axis denotes the number 
of years from enactment of the law. Since treatment states enacted first-person consent at 
different times, control states were randomly assigned one of the seven years in the sample in 
which a treatment state passed first-person consent legislation, and then centered about that year. 
Treatment and control states exhibit strikingly similar trends until the year of intervention, when 
the average donation rate among treatment states increases sharply relatively to the controls.  
Table 1 highlights demographic differences between the treatment and control states. 
Treatment states have fewer motor vehicle accident fatalities, a slightly older population, and 
fewer minority residents than their control counterparts before the intervention. Treatment and 
control states are similar in terms of healthcare expenditures and median income while treatment 
states have slightly higher donation rates prior to passing first-person consent, measured as the 
ratio of adult donors per 100 MVA fatalities. The last column in the table provides an initial 
estimate of the average treatment effect suggesting that first-person consent states experience 
greater growth in donation rates than control states after enacting the law. I preform specification 
tests in Section V to further explore the validity of inferences based upon this identification 
strategy. 
 
IV. Model  
The goal of my analysis is to estimate the organ donation rate as a function of the first-
person consent status of a given state in each year. I first consider the choice of the dependent 
variable where studies have traditionally used the natural log of donors per-million population 
(pmp). Ideally, the best measure of the donation rate would be the total number of donors divided 
by the total number of potential donors, which would include only those individuals whose cause 
and circumstance of death would have allowed for donation. Past analyses have conducted case 
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reviews of all deaths in a given geographical area to attempt to estimate the nation-wide potential 
donor pool (Guadagnoli, Christiansen, & Beasley, 2003; Sheehey et al., 2003). This procedure is 
extremely time consuming and cost-prohibitive; in recent years OPOs have begun to collect and 
analyze similar statistics, but no such measure of the donation rate is available for the time 
period under consideration for this study.  
Gay (2006) suggests that a suitable alternative measure of the donation rate is the number 
of donors per motor vehicle accident fatalities. The likelihood that an individual from the general 
population would become a potential organ donor is far less than that of an individual who died 
in a motor vehicle accident. Thus I expect that scaling donors by total population will attenuate 
the estimated effect of first-person consent legislation relative to weights that better reflect the 
pool of potential donors. The total number of yearly motor vehicle fatalities was relatively stable 
between 1991 and 2006 (though it has since declined). In 1995 there were 15.9 motor vehicle 
accident fatalities per 100,000 residents, which fell to 14.3 fatalities per 100,000 residents by 
2006. Adult donors who died in a motor vehicle accident made up the second largest share of 
total donors by circumstance of death, comprising 26.3% of total donations in 19959 and 20% in 
2006. If I instead follow Dickert-Conlin, Elder, & Moore (2011) and tabulate donors for whom 
an MVA was the circumstance of death, per-million population, I find an increase from 4.9 
donors pmp in 1995 to 5.4 donors pmp in 2006. A comparison of donor rate trends at the state 
level reveals little difference in trends regardless of whether total donors are scaled by state 
population, mortalities, or motor vehicle fatalities, and the trends are strikingly similar when 
examining all states in aggregate. If anything, the volatility is minimized when total donors are 
scaled by MVA fatalities. I find only small differences in statistical significance and magnitude 
of estimates for the primary variables of interest between different measures of donation rates, 
which I further discuss in Section V.  
I begin by estimating the following model 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒!" = 𝛼 + 𝛾 𝐹𝑃𝐶 !" + 𝑋!"𝛽 + 𝛿! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!"  , (1)   
where 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒!" is the natural log of donors pmp, donors per 1,000 mortalities, or donors 
per 100 MVA fatalities in year t in state s. I present primary results using donors per 100 MVA 
fatalities and present a comparison of regression results for all dependent variables in the 
                                                
9 MVA fatalities are second only to death by natural and uncategorized circumstances. The OPTN did not collect 
circumstance of death prior to April 1994. 
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appendix. I consider only organ donors 18 years and older; though some states allow minors to 
join their donor registries, parental consent is still ultimately required for donation. I include state 
and year fixed effects (𝛿! and 𝜏!, respectively) to control for unobservable state- and year-level 
trends that are correlated with the donation rate but not explained by the other independent 
variables. The first-person consent status of state s in year t is represented by the binary variable 𝐹𝑃𝐶!". This variable takes a value of 1 in the first year after first-person consent legislation was 
passed and each year thereafter. The coefficient 𝛾 is the difference-in-differences estimate, the 
change in the average donation rate for treatment states relative to the counterfactual change. The 
covariate vector 𝑋!" includes socioeconomic variables that may affect donation rates such as the 
natural log of median income, population density, and the natural log of per capita healthcare 
expenditures. It also includes demographic controls such as state population proportions of high 
school graduates, age groups, and minority racial and ethnic groups. I also include dummy 
variables indicating whether the given state had a universal motorcycle helmet law and a primary 
enforcement seatbelt law in year t. An additional specification includes the percentage of women 
in the state senate, which serves as an effective proxy measure for the progressivity of a state as 
demonstrated by Besley and Case (2000). This particular regression necessarily omits 
Washington D.C. since it has no state legislature. All regressions are weighted by state 
population and are estimated using clustered standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity10.  
  
V. Placebo Tests 
In order to ensure that underlying fundamental differences between treatment and control 
states do not bias estimates of the impact of first-person consent, I perform two assessments of 
my identifying assumptions. I first conduct an explicit test of the appropriateness of the selected 
control group by estimating a version of Equation (1) that includes lag and lead variables 
corresponding to up to three years prior and four years after the first-person consent intervention. 
Significant results for the lead variables would suggest potential reverse causality, indicating that 
the adoption of first-person consent was endogenous, potentially the result of declining donation 
rates. I estimate three specifications: the first includes state and year fixed effects, the second 
adds linear state-specific time trends, and the third includes quadratic state-specific time trends. 
Results are presented in Table 2 for each measure of the donation rate. The lead variable 
                                                
10 Huber & White, by state.  
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corresponding to the year before first-person consent was passed is significant when the 
dependent variable is donors per 10,000 mortalities and donors pmp, and including only fixed 
effects (columns 1 and 4, respectively). When state-specific time trends are added, these false 
policy variables are no longer significant and the models that add quadratic state-specific time 
trends preform similarly. These results indicate a need to allow time trends to differ between 
states, thus I include state-specific time trends in all further specifications.    
 I also analyze the robustness of my model by estimating Equation (1) using artificial 
outcome variables upon which the enactment of first-person consent should have no impact. I 
estimate separate models using the natural log of state population, the natural log of mortalities, 
and the percentage of children living in poverty as outcome variables and present the results in 
Table 3. I include a fourth specification using the natural log of donors per 100 MVA fatalities as 
the dependent variable for comparison. The treatment variable has no statistically significant 
effect on any of the artificial outcome variables, which provides evidence in favor of the internal 
validity of the model.  
 
VI. Results 
Estimates from least-squares regression of Equation (1) are presented in Table 4, where 
the dependent variable is the natural log of donors per 100 MVA mortalities. All models include 
linear state-specific time trends as well as state and year fixed effects. The results provide 
significant evidence that the enactment of first-person consent legislation is associated with 
higher rates of donation. Column 1 shows that on average, donation rates are approximately 14% 
higher in first-person consent states, however since Table 1 revealed demographic differences 
between treatment and control states, I also estimate additional specifications including other 
potential determinants of donation rates. Column 2 reveals that population density is positively 
correlated with donation rates, a possible indication of the importance of proximity to medical 
facilities in identifying and preserving potential organ donors. Columns 4-6 indicate that primary 
enforcement seatbelt laws are negatively correlated with donation rates. Contrary to 
expectations, I find no significant impact from donor registries that have been in place past one 
full driver’s license renewal period. Estimates of the effect of first-person consent are robust to 
the inclusion of additional covariates; overall, these specifications attribute roughly a 12.5-14.3% 
increase in donation rates to first-person consent laws. To further investigate the magnitude of 
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the estimated impact of the legislation, I present a comparison of all three measures of the 
donation rate in Table 5. The included independent variables for each model are the same as 
those in column 4 of Table 4. As predicted, the impact attributed to first-person consent when 
scaling donors by population is lower than that given by donors per 100 MVA deaths. Overall, 
first-person consent is associated with roughly 10-12.5% higher donation rates among treatment 
states. As a robustness check, I re-estimate excluding data from 2006 to ensure that any 
anticipatory trends leading up to the widespread adoption of the 2006 UAGA do not confound 
my estimates. Table 6 includes these results and they are relatively unchanged.  
Since donor registries are the primary method by which individuals document intent to 
donate, I next exclude treatment states that did not simultaneously enact first-person consent and 
a compliant donor registry (Table 7). Estimates for explanatory variables are largely similar in 
magnitude and significance from previous regressions. The exception is that for the proportion of 
female state senators, which was not significant in previous regressions but is positively 
associated with donation rates when included here. The estimated contribution of first-person 
consent to donor rates is larger still after restricting the treatment group, ranging from roughly 
15.5-18.3%.  
 
VII. Discussion & Conclusion 
My results identify a strong association between adoption of first-person consent and 
donor rate growth among treatment states. I find an even larger impact when considering only 
those states that implemented a legally binding donor registry at the same time. Enacting first-
person consent on its own is a low-cost solution, and all states have enacted some form of the 
legislation with little objection. Past studies have raised concerns about the behavior of OPOs 
with respect to first-person consent illustrating that despite the laws, procurement professionals 
generally continued to seek family permission for donation, in some cases overriding the 
expressed wishes of the donor (Mesich-Brant & Grossback, 2005; Wendler & Dickert, 2001). 
Several OPO directors stated in 2001 that some members of their procurement teams were 
unwilling to consider going against the wishes of families who expressed opposition to donation, 
and others expressed concern that enforcing first-person consent would lead to negative 
publicity, unintentionally decreasing public support for donation in general (Sokohl, 2002). An 
anonymous survey of OPOs in 2013 revealed that even by the time most states had enacted first-
  13 
person consent, 20% of procurement organizations were still unwilling to proceed with donation 
unless they had the consent of the family. Moreover, 35% of OPOs report that they have yet to 
proceed with donation in the event that the donor’s consent is clear but the family objects (Chon 
et. al 2013).  
I found that first-person consent was associated with donation rates that were 
approximately 15.5-18.3% higher when enacted with a compliant registry simultaneously. It is 
not clear what portion of the increase in donation rates should be attributed to removing the need 
for familial consent or to the registries themselves, which allow healthcare professionals to both 
confirm and make families aware of a person’s donor status. Siminoff & Lawrence (2002) found 
that in general, just over half of families of potential donors were uncertain about the wishes of 
the decedent, in which case families refused donation the majority of the time. It is well 
documented that family consent rates continually exceed 90% when the decedent has 
documented their desire to donate and especially when they had previously discussed their 
decision with their family (Rodrigue, Cornell, & Howard, 2005; Siminoff & Lawrence, 2002; 
Traino & Siminoff, 2013). Given that the expressed reluctance of OPOs to override family 
refusals only applies to a small fraction of cases, the primary barrier to realizing higher consent 
rates is the uncertainty families face about whether the decedent would have been willing to 
donate when no decision is documented. Some families report that they equate an unsigned 
driver’s license or lack of registration as a clear indication the decedent had declined donation 
instead of assuming the donor was undecided (Anker & Feeley, 2010). This implies that the most 
successful actions will be those that lead more individuals to communicate their donation 
preferences, either explicitly via a registry or by discussing it with family.   
One frequently proposed solution to help to mitigate uncertainty is mandated consent, 
wherein individuals are prompted to indicate their preference, typically when renewing a driver’s 
license, signing up for state benefits, or filing tax forms. Such a law was enacted in 2011 in 
California and driver’s license applicants are now made to choose either “Yes, I want to be a 
donor” or “No, not at this time”, but data revealing any impact have not yet been made available 
(Donate Life California, 2011). In the early 90’s, Virginia and Texas implemented a similar 
policy where registrants were required to choose between agreeing to donate, declining, or 
indicating they were undecided, however donor registrations did not increase as expected. After 
Virginia’s policy had been in place for six months, 31% of individuals who had renewed their 
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licenses had registered to donate, 45% declined, and 24% were undecided. The refusal rate was 
80% in Texas after the policy was implemented (Klassen, A. & Klassen, D., 1996; Siminoff, et 
al., 1995). It has been theorized that mandated consent returns such low registration rates 
because it forces upon individuals the uncomfortable consideration of their demise. Another 
potential contributing factor is fear and distrust, particularly among minorities, that healthcare 
professionals will not work as hard to save the life of a registered donor, or that brain death may 
be declared prematurely (Siminoff, et al., 1995). Such misunderstandings about the criteria for 
declaration of brain death and the donation process on a whole speak to the need for increased 
and targeted educational efforts.  
Despite questions about first-person consent enforcement practices, there has still been 
significant progress in increasing consent rates in recent years. Data from 2013 indicate an 
average consent rate of 73.6%, a vast improvement over previous years (UNOS 2013). Some 
have questioned the value of exhorting donor registries when only a small proportion of actual 
donors had ever registered, proposing that registered donors were the least likely to become 
potential donors since historically, the primary circumstances of death for donors were indicative 
of a non-random, higher-risk sample of the population (Howard & Byrne, 2007). Though the 
transplantation system has long relied heavily on marginal donors out of necessity, the 
proportion of actual donors who had joined a legally binding registry before death has since 
increased significantly from 19% in 2007 to 41% in 2012. Donate Life America reported the 
total number of donors among all state registries was 109 million in 2012 indicating a national 
registration rate of 45.4% among adults, up from roughly 65 million registrations in 2007 (DLA, 
2013). These statistics indicate that registered donors are no longer significantly 
underrepresented among actual donors. My results strongly reinforce the contribution of first-
person consent and donor registries to increased deceased donation rates, but given the extent by 
which this growth is dwarfed by the immense backlog of demand for transplants (Figure 1), it is 
clear that further work is needed to encourage individuals to communicate and explicitly 
document their donation decisions.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: 
 
Sources: SRTR, Table 1.3; OPTN, 2014   
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Figure 2: 
 
Mean donation rates for 13 treatment and 30 control states weighted by state population.  
Since first-person consent was introduced at different times for treatment states, control states were randomly assigned to a treatment state whose 
corresponding enactment year was assigned to be year zero for the control state.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 1991-2006 
 Before Intervention  After Intervention  
 Treatment Control Difference  Treatment Control Difference DD 
         
Donors/100 MVA fatalities (ln) 2.336 2.223 0.113***  2.779 2.514 0.265*** 0.152 
 (0.323) (0.344) [0.002]  (4.632) (4.632) [0.000]  
         
Median per capita income 53974.410 52754.170 1220.24  54107.392 54107.392 1931.65 711.41 
 (7,760.106) (6,831.680) [0.138]  (7,470.286) (7,470.286) 0.065  
         
Healthcare expenditure per capita 12361.747 12161.786 199.961  13430.043 13430.043 1050.18*** 850.219 
 (1,364.064) (1,309.183) [0.176]  (1,655.581) (1,655.581) [0.000]  
         
MVA deaths per 100,000  14.734 15.998 -1.264***  16.307 16.307 -2.646*** -1.382 
population (3.940) (5.078) [0.008]  (5.150) (5.150) [0.000]  
         
Percent age 18-34 0.337 0.350 -0.014***  0.325 0.325 -0.027*** -0.013 
 (0.029) (0.029) [0.000]  (0.026) (0.026) [0.000]  
         
Percent age 35-49 0.308 0.313 -0.005***  0.308 0.308 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.017) [0.007]  (0.014) (0.014) [0.176]  
         
Percent age 50-64 0.190 0.183 0.007***  0.215 0.215 0.006** -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.017) [0.000]  (0.021) (0.021) [0.011]  
         
Percent over age 65 0.165 0.153 0.012***  0.152 0.152 0.023*** 0.011 
 (0.020) (0.017) [0.000]  (0.017) (0.017) [0.000]  
         
Percent African American 0.091 0.129 -0.038***  0.097 0.118 -0.022 -0.016 
 (0.054) (0.101) [0.000]  (0.047) (0.089) [0.005]  
         
Percent Hispanic 0.054 0.138 -0.084***  0.062 0.105 -0.043 -0.041 
 (0.075) (0.127) [0.000]  (0.066) (0.121) [0.000]  
         
Observations 119 249 368  89 231 320 688 
States 30 13 43  30 13 43 43 
Means weighted by state population. Income and healthcare expenditures in 2012 dollars.  
Control states are centered about the intervention year of randomly matched treatment state.  
DD column contains initial difference-in-difference calculation (difference after – difference before).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level; p-values in brackets. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2: Placebo tests - Lags and Leads 
 Donors per 10,000 mortalities (ln) Donors per million population (ln) Donors/100 MVA fatalities (ln) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lead: t+3 -0.0107 0.0561 0.0893 -0.0068 0.0604 0.0948 -0.0277 0.0142 0.0532 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.058) (0.057) (0.052) (0.057) (0.054) (0.058) (0.062) 
          
Lead: t+2 -0.0404 0.0346 0.0590 -0.0369 0.0367 0.0610 -0.0438 -0.0017 0.0288 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.051) (0.044) (0.048) (0.052) (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) 
          
Lead: t+1 -0.0887** -0.0112 0.0083 -0.0894** -0.0144 0.0044 -0.0563 -0.0154 0.0077 
 (0.035) (0.045) (0.039) (0.035) (0.045) (0.039) (0.035) (0.042) (0.035) 
          
Intervention year: t 0.0041 -0.1215 0.0426 0.0106 -0.1206 0.0403 0.0743 -0.0385 0.1260 
 (0.052) (0.155) (0.159) (0.052) (0.154) (0.157) (0.064) (0.162) (0.156) 
          
Lag: t-1 -0.0090 -0.1031 0.0371 0.0020 -0.0989 0.0378 0.0684 -0.0305 0.1163 
 (0.055) (0.132) (0.138) (0.056) (0.131) (0.136) (0.060) (0.136) (0.133) 
          
Lag: t-2 -0.0508 -0.1159 0.0054 -0.0406 -0.1130 0.0054 -0.0188 -0.1007 0.0240 
 (0.048) (0.115) (0.107) (0.048) (0.113) (0.105) (0.044) (0.112) (0.102) 
          
Lag: t-3 -0.0389 -0.0728 0.0126 -0.0343 -0.0745 0.0085 0.0023 -0.0702 0.0276 
 (0.047) (0.098) (0.087) (0.047) (0.097) (0.087) (0.048) (0.092) (0.077) 
          
Lag: t-4 0.0509 -0.0008 0.0453 0.0544 0.0005 0.0445 0.0724* -0.0055 0.0493 
 (0.042) (0.078) (0.071) (0.042) (0.078) (0.071) (0.038) (0.069) (0.063) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Trends No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Quadratic Trends No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 
R2 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.997 0.997 0.998 
          Each lead and lag variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 in one year for each state.  
State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions as well as variables corresponding to primary enforcement motorcycle helmet and seat 
belt laws, healthcare expenditures, population density, race, ethnicity, and age groups.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 3 - Placebo Test: Pseudo Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Population (ln) Mortalities (ln) Child poverty (%) Donors/100 MVA  
fatalities (ln) 
     
First-person consent -0.0077 -0.0032 -0.0056 0.1247** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.060) 
     
Median income (ln) 0.0326** 0.0271* -0.2099*** -0.4538** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.041) (0.196) 
     
Healthcare expenditures per capita (ln) -0.0444 0.1151 0.0577 -0.7250* 
 (0.051) (0.080) (0.054) (0.363) 
     
Population density 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.0014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Percent African American -0.1492* -0.1559 0.3155 0.2762 
 (0.076) (0.094) (0.211) (1.107) 
     
Percent Hispanic 0.1253 0.1545* 0.3601** -3.2588** 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.151) (1.239) 
     
Percent high school graduates -0.1249 -0.0228 -0.0955 -0.5052 
 (0.091) (0.086) (0.171) (1.283) 
     
Percent age 18-34 -0.0831 -0.0320 0.0052 -0.1790 
 (0.091) (0.100) (0.239) (1.277) 
     
Percent over age 65 -0.4475*** -0.1193 0.0173 -0.0686 
 (0.136) (0.123) (0.213) (1.610) 
     
Motorcycle helmet law -0.0129*** -0.0086*** 0.0055 0.0493* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.028) 
     
Primary enforcement seatbelt law -0.0005 -0.0032 0.0047 -0.0790** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.036) 
     
Observations 688 688 688 688 
R2 1.000 1.000 0.865 0.898 
AIC -4700.9720 -4328.3939 -3389.8036 -808.1243 
Regressions 2 – 4 weighted by state population  
All models include state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 4: Dependent Variable – Donors per 100 MVA Mortalities (ln) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
First-person consent 0.1430** 0.1367** 0.1280** 0.1247** 0.1287** 0.1305** 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) 
       
Median income (ln)  -0.3645* -0.4321** -0.4538** -0.4162** -0.4084* 
  (0.186) (0.193) (0.196) (0.206) (0.203) 
       
Healthcare expenditures per capita (ln)  -0.7446** -0.5625 -0.7250* -0.6131 -0.5965 
  (0.344) (0.343) (0.363) (0.383) (0.372) 
       
Population density  0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0053 0.0057 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Percent African American   0.0136 0.2762 0.2354 0.3357 
   (1.115) (1.107) (1.120) (1.074) 
       
Percent Hispanic   -3.2217** -3.2588** -2.8798** -2.8562** 
   (1.366) (1.239) (1.348) (1.348) 
       
Percent high school graduates   -0.3925 -0.5052 -0.4792 -0.4290 
   (1.273) (1.283) (1.315) (1.293) 
       
Percent age 18-34   -0.1793 -0.1790 -0.0495 -0.0343 
   (1.346) (1.277) (1.237) (1.237) 
       
Percent age 35-49   1.7595 1.8799 2.3563 2.3332 
   (1.850) (1.793) (1.786) (1.778) 
       
Percent over age 65   -0.5363 -0.0686 0.3526 0.3579 
   (1.565) (1.610) (1.592) (1.588) 
       
Motorcycle helmet law    0.0493* 0.0382 0.0342 
    (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) 
       
Primary enforcement seatbelt law    -0.0790** -0.0680* -0.0662* 
    (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) 
       
Percent female in state senate     0.3839 0.3928 
     (0.245) (0.241) 
       
Registry in place past one license       0.0308 
renewal period      (0.053) 
       
Observations 688 688 688 688 672 672 
R2 0.890 0.893 0.897 0.898 0.899 0.899 
AIC -777.4029 -795.0533 -803.3062 -808.1243 -800.9779 -799.6286 
Regressions weighted by state population 
Models 4 and 5 omit Washington D.C. since it has no state senate 
All models include state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 5: Dependent Variable Comparison 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Donors/10k mortalities (ln) Donors/1m population (ln) Donors/100 MVA 
mortalities (ln) 
    
First-person consent 0.1011* 0.1057* 0.1247** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.060) 
    
Median income (ln) -0.1897 -0.1951 -0.4538** 
 (0.187) (0.189) (0.196) 
    
Healthcare expenditures per capita  0.1036 0.2631 -0.7250* 
(ln) (0.345) (0.363) (0.363) 
    
Population density 0.0008** 0.0009*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Percent African American -0.1587 -0.1654 0.2762 
 (1.070) (1.096) (1.107) 
    
Percent Hispanic -1.3373 -1.3082 -3.2588** 
 (1.065) (1.044) (1.239) 
    
Percent high school graduates -0.1818 -0.0797 -0.5052 
 (1.121) (1.121) (1.283) 
    
Percent age 18-34 0.0361 0.0872 -0.1790 
 (1.239) (1.231) (1.277) 
    
Percent age 35-49 1.4177 1.4693 1.8799 
 (1.671) (1.653) (1.793) 
    
Percent over age 65 -0.6408 -0.3127 -0.0686 
 (1.441) (1.411) (1.610) 
    
Motorcycle helmet law 0.0040 0.0082 0.0493* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) 
    
Primary enforcement seatbelt law -0.0734* -0.0761* -0.0790** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) 
    
Observations 688 688 688 
R2 0.814 0.801 0.898 
AIC -929.9997 -923.3264 -808.1243 
Regressions weighted by state population 
All models include state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 6: Robustness Check – Exclude 2006  
Dependent Variable – Donors per 100 MVA Mortalities (ln) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
First-person consent 0.1473** 0.1424** 0.1417** 0.1360** 0.1415** 0.1437** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.058) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) 
       
Median income (ln)  -0.3730** -0.4796** -0.4950** -0.4712** -0.4646** 
  (0.184) (0.190) (0.195) (0.202) (0.199) 
       
Healthcare expenditures per capita (ln)  -0.7165* -0.5421 -0.6409 -0.5325 -0.5190 
  (0.426) (0.337) (0.388) (0.394) (0.387) 
       
Population density  0.0015*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0051 0.0055 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) 
       
Percent African American   0.0429 0.3982 0.3279 0.4089 
   (1.150) (1.118) (1.152) (1.112) 
       
Percent Hispanic   -3.3361** -3.4082** -3.0975** -3.0937** 
   (1.472) (1.291) (1.373) (1.370) 
       
Percent high school graduates   0.3464 0.1533 0.1844 0.2338 
   (1.244) (1.271) (1.294) (1.261) 
       
Percent age 18-34   -0.2795 -0.2245 -0.0905 -0.0696 
   (1.316) (1.232) (1.195) (1.194) 
       
Percent age 35-49   1.5306 1.7222 2.1826 2.1774 
   (1.805) (1.732) (1.717) (1.709) 
       
Percent over age 65   -1.1320 -0.5859 -0.1979 -0.1800 
   (1.491) (1.549) (1.506) (1.503) 
       
Motorcycle helmet law    0.0655** 0.0548** 0.0508** 
    (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) 
       
Primary enforcement seatbelt law    -0.0837** -0.0701* -0.0678* 
    (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) 
       
Percent female in state senate     0.3756 0.3846 
     (0.243) (0.240) 
       
Registry in place past one license       0.0274 
renewal period      (0.055) 
       
Observations 645 645 645 645 630 630 
R2 0.891 0.894 0.898 0.899 0.900 0.901 
AIC -767.7277 -779.3266 -790.1006 -796.2556 -788.9514 -787.4395 
Regressions weighted by state population 
Models 4 and 5 omit Washington D.C. since it has no state senate 
All models include state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 7: Simultaneous First-Person Consent Legislation and New Registry Enactment 
Dependent Variable – Donors per 100 MVA Mortalities (ln) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
First-person consent 0.1834*** 0.1694** 0.1601** 0.1553** 0.1631** 0.1676** 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.065) (0.067) (0.064) (0.064) 
       
Median income (ln)  -0.3768* -0.4424** -0.4752** -0.4559** -0.4513** 
  (0.203) (0.212) (0.212) (0.220) (0.218) 
       
Healthcare expenditures per capita (ln)  -0.7549** -0.5669 -0.7626** -0.6381 -0.6122 
  (0.339) (0.371) (0.371) (0.396) (0.384) 
       
Population density  0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0041 0.0046 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Percent African American   0.3035 0.6600 0.7571 0.9224 
   (1.227) (1.219) (1.232) (1.174) 
       
Percent Hispanic   -3.0606* -3.0572** -2.5962* -2.5121* 
   (1.555) (1.359) (1.460) (1.447) 
       
Percent high school graduates   -0.4190 -0.4855 -0.3745 -0.2431 
   (1.341) (1.304) (1.366) (1.318) 
       
Percent age 18-34   -0.3534 -0.4177 -0.3400 -0.3123 
   (1.548) (1.472) (1.425) (1.429) 
       
Percent age 35-49   2.1760 2.2531 2.7483 2.6921 
   (2.099) (2.039) (2.005) (1.996) 
       
Percent over age 65   -0.4800 0.0934 0.5960 0.6389 
   (1.690) (1.715) (1.677) (1.670) 
       
Motorcycle helmet law    0.0525* 0.0405 0.0342 
    (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) 
       
Primary enforcement seatbelt law    -0.0902** -0.0755** -0.0730** 
    (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) 
       
Percent female in state senate     0.5117** 0.5317** 
     (0.248) (0.240) 
       
Registry in place past one license       0.0486 
Renewal period      (0.057) 
       
Observations 624 624 624 624 608 608 
R2 0.896 0.899 0.903 0.904 0.906 0.906 
AIC -730.2479 -745.1656 -753.5298 -760.7094 -754.9494 -754.4401 
Regressions weighted by state population 
All models include only those states that simultaneously enacted first-person consent and a compliant donor registry.  
Excluded states are Kansas, New Mexico, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
Models 4 and 5 omit Washington D.C. since it has no state senate 
All models include state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
